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Article by Sayak Dasgupta

Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: A new dance drama in the Middle East

Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: A new dance drama in the Middle East

Sayak Dasgupta

With every passing day, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), widely referred to as the ‘Iran Nuclear Deal’ is witnessing new developments. The JCPOA is an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America + Germany) which came into effect on 14th July, 2015 in Vienna.


Many experts, at that time, claimed that this arrangement was a landmark achievement in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. However, the same has also received its share of backlash and criticism over its viability after the formal exit of the United States from the deal in 2018 and Tehran’s act of non-compliance with the treaty while still being party to it.


Since POTUS Joe Biden came to office, the new administration has been occupied with reversing and revoking the policies that were adopted by the previous government, including but not restricted to foreign policy measures. The United States, under the presidency of Joe Biden, has acceded back to the Paris Climate Accord, removed the previous administration’s controversial ‘Muslim Immigration Ban’, rescinded the withdrawal from the World Health Organization, and has extended the new START treaty with the Russian Federation, among several other actions. Nonetheless, when policy frameworks of the US revolve around the JCPOA under the current administration, optimism is not an outlandish belief.


Despite the two major players in this scenario, Iran and the USA joining or considering to join the European Union brokered informal meeting on reviving the JCPOA, not much can be expected out of this setup due to the ambiguity of both the parties towards building confidence with one another. There still exists a hostile environment between these two countries with the previous US Government listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization , and the reluctance of the present administration to reverse that decision. The killing of the Iranian General, Qasem Soleimani by the US came as a major setback for Tehran, and thus they retaliated by listing “all legal and real persons and troops of the United States and its allies operating in the West Asian region” as terrorists. The United States also expressed its concern for the alleged capability of the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missiles to carry nuclear weapons which would be detrimental in securing peace and stability in the Middle East and Europe.


Though Tehran keeps reiterating that they will not possess nuclear weapons since the Islamic principles and ideology prevents them from acquiring such Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), on February 22nd 2021, while taking a dig at Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khamenei said, “if the Islamic Republic wished to build nuclear weapons, he and people much bigger than him would not be able to stop it.” While controversies around this statement can be dismissed on the grounds of it being too rhetorical, it is not to be taken lightly. In the same address, the supreme leader stated, “We are determined to develop our nuclear capabilities in line with the needs of the country. For this reason, Iran’s enrichment will not be limited to 20 per cent, and we will take whatever action is necessary for the country. For example, for developing nuclear propulsion and other activities, we may even increase enrichment to 60 per cent.”


Such statements coming from the Leader of the Islamic Republic should be considered as a prompt call for the US and its allies to reinstate the JCPOA and hold up their end of the bargain to ensure Iran’s commitment to the agreement.

As of 23rd February 2021, Tehran has taken a step forward, straying further from the principles of the JCPOA by halting the implementation of the additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out short-notice inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities after the Iranian Parliament passed a law called the ‘Strategic Action to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Nation’s Rights’. The law states that Iran should undertake certain nuclear policy measures such as raising the level of uranium enrichment to 20 per cent and suspend its voluntary implementation of the additional protocol for a few months if the western parties fail to honour their obligations under the JCPOA.


Another reason cited by Tehran was the failure of US in lifting the sanctions imposed against them by the Trump administration. Such actions by Iran, coupled with its assertive stance on its Western counterparts to uphold their part of the deal and its objection to US unilateral sanctions against them sends a clear message from them to the rest of the world that they are not willing to get side-lined under an invented pretext.


So, what if Iran is not convinced with the outcome(s) of the negotiations that will follow the reinstatement of the JCPOA? What if the Islamic Republic faces more international and unilateral sanctions due to its stringent non-compliance? Will Tehran take a breakthrough decision to withdraw from the NPT in the near future and develop its own Nuclear Weapons capacity? The real answers to these questions are not known as of now. But in line with the policies of the major stakeholders of this issue, it can be assumed that the Islamic Republic of Iran is unlikely to possess Nuclear Weapons as of now, the alternative to which will be a major and drastic policy shift for them.


Iran is the country that originally presented the initiative of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East in 1974. It also endorses the adoption of the 2010 plan of action on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Secondly, Iran has, on multiple occasions called out Israel for not being a signatory of the NPT and allegedly claiming that they possess nuclear weapons and other WMDs. Thus, it’s more likely for Iran to not possess nuclear weapons (at least in theory) while criticising Israel on this issue simultaneously. But what if Iran is ready to take the risk of possessing nuclear weapons and at the same time be public about it?


When the Iranian supreme leader said that they are willing to take all possible necessary measures in order to enhance their nuclear capabilities for the development of the country, was he hinting towards the development of nuclear weapons for that end? This statement is reminiscent of certain global challenges which include, but are not limited to, Israel’s ambiguous possession of nuclear weapons in the region or NATO’s Nuclear Weapons Sharing Arrangement (more commonly referred to as NATO’s Nuclear Umbrella) which could trigger the alliance to mobilise their nuclear arsenal if its European allies feel threatened by Iran’s ambitions. To that end, even the United States can get down to not considering Iran under their negative security assurance policy against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To date, only China, Russia, and North Korea (DPRK) are not under the ambit of the negative security assurances of the United States. Additionally, such actions would likely prompt the international community to impose strict sanctions on the already dying economy of the Islamic Republic.


Nothing can be said for certain regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the reinstatement of the JCPOA. Both Iran and the USA are calling upon one another to return to their original obligation of acquiescence but none of them are willing to take the first step. Iran wants the immediate revocation of the unilateral and damaging sanctions imposed on them by the United States and the latter wants Iran to return to its 2015 scope of compliance with the JCPOA.

The reluctance of both parties in upholding their end of the bargain indicates a lack of diplomatic cooperation. Although the EU orchestrated meeting is the first step towards bridging the differences between US and Iran, the reinstatement of the Nuclear Agreement and mending of ties between these two nations will be a bumpy ride in the years to come.


(cover picture courtesy: npr.org)


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srijonsen.42
srijonsen.42
Mar 05, 2021

Brilliantly analyzed and articulated

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